(Excerpts - Transcribed & Submitted by Sandi Carter & Marlene Clark)
During the tragic "Brother’s War" the Union forts remaining in the Indian Territory were abandoned, some of them to be used by Confederates. Following that conflict yet more tribes of Indians were removed to the Indian Territory -- at the same time that angry Texans, Kansans and New Mexicans were demanding that the Plains nomads be confined to permanent reservations and forced to end their wanderings. The result was yet another group of forts - Sill, Reno and Supply - and the sending of yet more troops to the region.
These soldiers who came to the Indian territory found a hard, lonely, thankless life filled with danger and difficulty. Almost always there were too few of them for the tasks demanded. Following the end of the War of 1812 the United States Army totaled only 7,200 men, a figure that remained constant until the outbreak of the Mexican War. When war was declared in 1846, Congress authorized the enlistment of 50,000 and more volunteers, but at the close of the conflict the Army was returned to near its pre-war size. Arguments were advanced in Congress that this number should be increased, for the nation's domain had almost doubled between 1845 and 1848. Therefore in 1850 Congress authorized a legal strength of 14,000; five years later Congress again proved generous, allowing the creation of four new regiments which brought the Army to some 18,000 men. Following the close of the Civil War, during which the Army increased to more than a million men, Congress in 1866 reduced it to 54,302 men, in 1869 to 45,000, in 1870 to 30,000, and in 1874 to 25,000. Such was the size of the Army called upon to man all Army posts in the United States, to enforce reconstruction during the years 1865-1877, and to contend with frontier Indian problems.
Moreover, Congress proved exceedingly stingy in voting funds for weapons and equipment for these troops. For example, Congress in 1866 decreed that the Army had to exhaust war surpluses before ordering new materials, which meant that for ten years almost all weapons and equipment were obsolete.
The men in the Army were volunteers except during the Civil War. From 1817 to 1890 their age averaged twenty-three, many of whom were recent immigrants. Some enlistees were attracted to the life by the steady employment it offered and by the challenge of soldiering. Until 1854 they received $7.00 a month in the infantry and $8.00 a month in the cavalry; this was increased by $4.00 a month in 1854, and after the Civil War to $13.00 a month for cavalry and infantry. In addition, they also received regular rations, free medical care and some other benefits. Other volunteers joined to "see the elephant" lured by tales of adventure in the West. The military life also attracted criminals and other undesirables who found it expedient to travel.
Once a man was assigned to a regiment, he rarely transferred out of it, no matter how long he remained in the Army. In fact, he usually did not transfer out of the company to which he was sent. Even at small posts consisting of only a company or two, a man had little contact with anyone other than the men of his own outfit. In this company he found himself almost completely at the mercy of his noncommissioned officers. He could not even speak to an officer without the permission of his first sergeant, who actually ran the company. And an ability with fists was one of the first requisites for promotion to noncommissioned officer status. These men, along with the officers, could be brutal and sadistic or humane and gentle, depending more on personal temperament than on regulations. Because of isolation and ignorance, few soldiers knew how to go about complaining of injustices, and few court martials were held to punish officers and noncoms for brutality. Punishments for enlisted men ranged from marching double-time around the parade ground to suspension from thumbs, wrists or arms in the guardhouse for a full day at a time. Harsh and unusual punishments could be given with relative impunity.
The food was not good. A typical daily menu started with a breakfast of salt pork, fried mush and strong black coffee; lunch usually consisted of dry bread and "slumgullion stew," a concoction of debatable ancestry; and the evening meal normally was more dry bread and more coffee, occasionally with three prunes for dessert. Men at the frontier forts, as in Oklahoma, tried to supplement there diets with buffalo, deer, wild turkey, fish and other game; and they purchased fresh vegetables from the Indian farmers where possible.
The medical service available to these soldiers was primitive, to say the least, and the death rate among these men was appallingly high. Cholera, dysentery, fevers, even scurvy were commonplace according to medical reports forwarded to Washington, while venereal disease was epidemic.
Duty at posts in the Indian Territory therefore was hard and dangerous. The men had to erect their quarters themselves, cutting the logs or quarrying the stone, moving these to the desired location, and erecting them according to plans drawn by their officers. They fought malarial and bilious fevers, ate the government’s hardtack and bacon, escorted supply wagons, scouted new territory, and, sometimes, fought Indians or white renegades.
Captain Randolph B. Marcy in August, 1850, established a camp seventy-five miles southeast of Fort Washita on the Fort Smith-Santa Fe Road. This camp was given the name of the man who long had been connected with the area, Arbuckle. However, word soon came that this was an unacceptable site and that Marcy should relocate it to the south on the Washita River. (25)
In April, 1851, the captain and Company D of the 5th Infantry marched to a spot on Wild Horse Creek some four miles south of the Washita. The new site again was named Arbuckle and received the designation of fort in Army records. It was formally designated a fort in June of 1851 when Brevet Brigadier General Matthew Arbuckle died. The soldiers of the 5th Infantry thereupon were replaced at Fort Arbuckle by the troops of Arbuckle’s old command, the 7th Infantry, under the command of Major George Anderson. (26)
In 1852, Captain Marcy, accompanied by Captain George B. McClellan and a company of the 5th Infantry, set out from Fort Belknap, Texas, on a trip of exploration along the Red River to the site of the future Fort Sill. They ended this trek at Fort Arbuckle. These two later would serve together under altered circumstances (when McClellan was commander of the Army of the Potomac, Marcy would be his Chief of Staff.) (27)
The soldiers at Fort Arbuckle spent most of their time building roads and engaging in an endless round of court martials. Those officers who were not on detached duty seemed to spend most of their time either sitting on court martial boards or being court martialed themselves. For example, in March, 1852, Brevet Major J. C. Henshaw, the commander of the post, placed First Lieutenant Stevenson under arrest, and in May they both went to Fort Gibson for the trial. The lieutenant was returned to duty in July and then departed to sit on a court martial board in September. Major Henshaw was placed under arrest in January, 1855, tried in November that year, and dismissed from the service in February, 1856. Other officers seemed to devote much of their time to trying or being tried under the articles of war. (28)
The 7th Infantry Regiment located its headquarters at the fort on June 26, 1857. On the third of October of that year, the headquarters was shifted back to Fort Smith. In February, 1858, the 7th Infantry marched out of Fort Arbuckle,
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(25) "Return of Fort
Arbuckle," National Archives Microfilm 617, Roll 38.
(26) Ibid.
(27) W. S. Nye, Carbine and Lance (University of Oklahoma Press:
Norman, 1969), p. 17; and George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the
Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, New York (3
vols., Houghton, Mifflin and Company: New York, 1891), Vol. I, p. 521.
(28) "Returns of Fort Arbuckle." National Archives Microfilm 617, Roll
38.
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leaving it abandoned. (29) First Lieutenant James E. Powell, in command of Company E of the 1st United States Infantry, reoccupied the post on June 29, 1858. The fort continued to be occupied, except during the Civil War, until June 1870, when it was abandoned for the better location of Fort Sill.
Prior to the Civil War there were a seried of incidents that pointed up the difficulties of the Army in dealing with the Plains Indians who crossed the Army’s administrative boundaries in their raids into Texas. These Indians held the mistaken idea that they were dealing with two separate nations of white men; Texans and Americans; it was hard to convince them that Texas had become part of the Union. In 1858 the command in Texas decided to pursue the raiding Comanche aggressively. Brevet Major Ear Van Dorn of the Second Calvary was put in charge of a force at Fort Belknap. He rode out in September and established a forward camp on the banks of Otter Creek. He named this stockaded camp after a fellow officer of the Second Cavalry, Charles Radziminski, a native of Poland who had died of consumption the previous August. (30)
The target of these troops from Texas was the Comanches at Fort Arbuckle. Captain William E. Prince, the commander of Fort Arbuckle who had just been released from arrest in August, was in the process of holding discussions with the Indians. The Comanche chiefs were attempting to repair the damage done by young braves who had stolen horses from the Choctaws, Chickasaws and Wichitas in the vicinity of Fort Arbuckle. Expressions of friendship were exchanged between the chiefs and Captain Prince. (31)
On September 15, 1858, Van Dorn’s troops encountered the Comanches of Chief Buffalo Hump at their camp near Rush Springs, (32) In the ensuing battle fifty-eight Indians, including two women, were killed. Another twenty-five later died of wounds. Van Dorn himself was wounded, but clearly emerged as a hero in Texas for punishing the Indians who had been raiding. However, the Indians felt they had been betrayed because of their conversations with Captain Prince at Fort Arbuckle. The troops moving out of Camp Radziminski obviously had not been acting in coordination with those at Arbuckle. (33) This provoked Commanding General of the Army Winifield Scott
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(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) George T. Price, Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry (Antiquarian
Press Ltd.: New York, 1959), p. 131.
(32) "Returns of Fort Arbuckle," and Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen
in Blue (Macmillan Company: New York, 1967), p. 131.
(33) This was the polite English version of his name. (Chief Buffalo Hump)
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to issue order placing the new commander of Fort Arbuckle, Major William H. Emory, under the dual control of the Department of the West and the Department of Texas, not a usual or happy military arrangement. (34)
Chief Buffalo Hump’s people felt revengeful, for they did not believe that the United States and Texas were the same nation. Van Dorn, who was not expected to live, recovered from his wound and returned to his command at Camp Radziminski. He was able in the next campaigning season to attach the Comanches at Crooked Creek. The Indians were badly defeated but successful in wounding Captain E. Kirby Smith and Lieutenant Fitzhugh Lee and killing four (including two Indian allies of the white man). (35)
In the fall of 1859, Major Emory left Fort Arbuckle to select a site for a new fort. He decided on a location at the junction of Pound Creek and the
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(34) Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, p. 131, and Nye, Carbine
and Lance, p. 21.
(35) Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, p. 133.
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Washita River. When Fort Cobb was erected at this spot, Camp Radziminski was abandoned. It had been moved a few times in the course of its existence, but Radziminski had always retained its nature as a temporary forward base for campaigns against the Comanches. (36)
The Indians possibly found confirmation for their belief that the United States and Texas were two different nations when the Civil War broke out. Major Emory at Fort Arbuckle eventually would command the 5th Cavalry (the later designation of the Second Cavalry of the Radziminski Campaign)and become a Brevet Major General in the Union Army, while the officers of the Second Cavalry and Camp Radziminisky, Major Van Dorn, Captain E. Kirby Smith and Lieutenant Fitzhugh Lee all became generals in the Confederacy. (37)
As the Indians were moved westward, the Army had been sent to defend the frontier. From 1834 to 1861 that frontier had shifted westward from the border of Arkansas to the lands of the Comanches and Kiowas. Tribes that were first encountered by the Dragoons in their costly expedition of 1834 had become the major threat to and opponent of troops in the Indian Territory by 1861. During this period the soldiers had policed the liquor traffic, negotiated treaties and fought or protected the different Indian tribes as national policy dictated.
Many of the officers of that era deserve to be remembered and honored. Such men as Captains Stuart and Marcy were good officers who made valuable contributions; occasionally they thought better of the Indian population than the citizens of Arkansas -- and had cause to do so. Colonel Arbuckle, Major Mason and Lieutenant Holmes not only left their names on the countryside of Oklahoma, but also contributed significantly to its history. Memories of Oklahoma and associations formed there doubtless affected the military decisions of Jefferson Davis and George B. McClellan during the Civil War, while places such as Forts Coffee, Wayne and Arbuckle and Camps Canadian, Mason and Radziminski formed important entries in our national annals. Yet the troops who served there found the duty hard and often unhealthy, more characterized by the tedium of road and post construction than the excitement of battle or exploration. Their government paid them poorly, while their fellow citizens conceded them little honor. Their efforts and achievements deserve better in the land in which so many of them died lonely deaths.
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(36) Nye, Carbine and Lance, p. 133.
(37) Ibid.
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In order to maintain an initiative in the Indian Territory, officials in the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, decided to send a representative to treat with the Five civilized Tribes and other native Americans in the territory. In March, 1861, President Jefferson Davis appointed Albert Pike commissioner to all Indians west of Arkansas and south of Kansas. (4) Davis made an excellent choice. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, in December 1809, Pike grew to maturity in the small town of Newburyport. He attended local public schools and entered Harvard at the age of sixteen. The next year he quit the university and became a full-time school teacher. In 1831, he resigned this position and started west. For two years the young Yankee traveled, traded and lived among various tribes of plains Indians, and he became familiar with their languages and customs. In 1833, he settled in Little Rock, Arkansas, where he edited a newspaper, practiced law and became prominent in local society. During the Mexican War he served as a captain in the cavalry, and, when civil war seemed imminent, Pike offered his services to the Confederacy. (5) The tall, broad-shouldered lawyer from Little Rock enthusiastically accepted the assignment.
While Pike prepared to embark on his mission, Confederate gunners opened fire on Fort Sumter and the Civil War began. As a result, units of the United States Army stationed in the Indian Territory prepared to defend the region against an invasion by Southern Forces in Texas. Lieutenant Colonel William H. Emory, the Federal commander, concentrated his troops at Fort Washita near the Red River. However, Emory realized his small force could not repel a determined effort by the Confederates, and in mid-April, he received orders to evacuate the Indian Territory. He immediately withdrew to the vicinity of Fort Cobb to assemble the entire 750-man detachment and on May 9, started for Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (6) The Confederates reacted quickly and occupied Fort Washita on April 16, Fort Arbuckle on May 5 and Fort Cobb on May 14. (7) Although harassed by an overzealous advanced guard of Texans --which the Federals captured, then paroled -- Emory’s command straggled into Leavenworth three weeks after it left Fort Cobb with the loss of only two men, both deserters. (8)
Because of the evacuation of the Indian Territory by the United States Army, Pike encountered little opposition negotiating treaties with the Indians. Also, he gained a second advantage when several of the federal agents among the tribes professed loyalty to the Confederacy. (9) Pike first met with Chief John Ross of the Cherokees, but he made little headway as Ross stubbornly adhered to a policy of strict neutrality. Disappointed but not discouraged,
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(4) Ibid., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 785.
(5) William C. Boyden, A Bibliography of the Writings of Albert Pike (Washington:
n.p., 1931), no page.
(6) Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. I. pp. 648, 667.
(7) Ibid., pp. 648, 652.
(8) Ibid., pp. 648.
(9) Ibid., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 360.
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the commissioner moved on to parley with the Choctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks. By mid-July he successfully had completed treaties with those tribes. On August 1, Pike signed an agreement with the Seminoles, and twelve days later the Wichitas and other tribes of plains Indians from the southwestern part of the territory accepted Pike’s terms. He then returned to the Cherokee Nation and reopened negotiations with Chief Ross. (10)
Since Pike’s first visit, the situation among the Cherokees had changed radically. Stand Watie, a Cherokee leader who supported the South, had organized a large number of tribesmen into militia units and had joined Confederate troops in Arkansas. Also, Ross’ commitments to strict neutrality became increasingly unrealistic as other tribes agreed to alliance with the Confederacy. On October 7, after several weeks of negotiations, leaders of the Cherokee Nation signed a treaty with Pike. (11)
All of the agreements negotiated by the Confederate commissioner basically contained the same provisions. The government in Richmond promised to protect the tribes from invasion, to continue payment of annuities, to ensure a measure of tribal self-government, to legalize the institution of slavery and to guarantee the Indians’ right to their lands. In return, the Indians agreed to an alliance with the Confederacy and promised to provide troops to fight only in the Indian Territory.
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(10) James W. Ware, "Indian Territory," The
Western Territories in the Civil War, ed. LeRoy H. Fischer (Manhattan,
Kansas: Journal of the West, Inc., 1977), p. 104.
(11) Ibid.
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Pickets sent out from Fort Davis exchanged shots with the new occupants of Fort Gibson, and Colonel William Weer, commander of the invaders, hesitated. The federals overestimated the size of Cooper’s command, and they expected Pike to arrive with reinforcements at any time. Moreover, dissension among senior Union officers prevented a full-scale engagement. Subordinates arrested Weer on charges of incompetency and withdrew the expedition to Fort Scott, Kansas. (25)
A more-determined and better-organized Union Army returned to Indian Territory on October and ended control by Confederates of the region north of the Arkansas River. They were helped by the frustration and infighting which had weakened the Confederate command, causing Pike to resign in July. Nevertheless, when federal invaders crossed into Indian Territory, Cooper marched out from Fort Davis to meet them. The crucial battle took place at Beattie’s Prairie, near old Fort Wayne. At seven o’clock the morning of October 22, 1862, Cooper’s force of Texans and Indians engaged a portion of the invading army commanded by Brigadier General James G. Blunt. Blunt led a cavalry charge that completely routed the
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(25) Marion S. Brooks, "The History of the Indian Territory during the Civil War," Master of Arts Thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1917, pp. 132-133; Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. XIII, p. 161; Albert Costel, A Frontier State at War: Kansas 1861-1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 98.
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Confederates. (26) The Battle of Beattie’s Prairie not only removed the South’s challenge to the federals for control of the region north of the Arkansas River, but also signaled the end of Fort Davis. Cooper no longer possessed a force large enough to defend the fort.
Following Cooper’s defeat, units of the Union Army moved unmolested through the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas, and on Christmas Day, 1862, the 3rd Indian Regiment camped near Fort Gibson. Colonel William A. Phillips, regimental commander, decided to boost the morale of the men and to effect a show of force with an attack on Fort Davis. Apparently only a small detachment of Confederates remained at the fort as Cooper encamped with most of the Texans and many of the Indians at Skullyville in the Choctaw Nation. Rainy weather delayed Phillips’ plans, and not until the morning of December 27 did the regiment ford the Arkansas at Frozen Rock. The Federals captured the fort without a fight. Despite the cool, wet weather, soldiers fired the buildings. The conflagration eagerly consumed the wooden structures, and the flames were seen at a distance of twenty-five miles. (27) The symbol of domination of Indian Territory by the Confederacy became a heap of ashes less than a year after its completion.
After the battle of Pea Ridge in Marcy, 1862, Pike withdrew deep into the Choctaw Nation and began the construction of Fort McCulloch. Named for General Benjamin McCulloch, who died at Pea Ridge, the fort consisted of extensive earthen works atop a bluff on the south side of the Blue River, near Nail’s Crossing. The Missouri-to-Texas Road forded the Blue at Nail’s Crossing, and Pike’s breast works commanded the site, as well as other overland trails that led east to Fort Smith, west to Fort Washita, and south to Sherman, Texas. Within 100 yards of either side of the main fortifications, workers dug pits to serve as magazines to store ammunition. (28) Apparently no permanent structures rose within the confines of the fort, and the soldiers lived in tents or makeshift dwellings.
The size of the garrison at Fort McCulloch varied widely. On paper it consisted of one regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery from Arkansas, two regiments of cavalry from Texas, and eighteen unassigned pieces of artillery. At full strength this force should have totaled 3,000 men.
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(26) Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. XIII. 325.
(27) Donald L. Rampp and Larry C. Rampp, The Civil War in Indian Territory (Austin:
Presidential Press, 1975), 18-19; Official Records, Ser. I. Vol. XXII,
Pt. 2, pp. 61-62, 873-874; "Notes and Documents," The Chronicles of
Oklahoma, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (Autumn, 1945), p. 293.
(28) Wright and Fischer, "Civil War Sites," The Chronicles of
Oklahoma, Vol. XLIV, pp. 163-165; Dean Trickett, "The Civil War in
Indian Territory - 1862," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XIX, No.
4 (December, 1941), p. 393; Morrison, Military Posts, pp. 127, 130.
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Camp Nichols saw little hostile activity. Mounted howitzers stood at the corners of the little post in anticipation of attack, but life at the lonely guardian on the prairies consisted of routine garrison duties. Respite from the monotony came about every two weeks. Wagon trains halted at the post for protection on their journey eastward, and the troops stationed at Camp Nichols escorted them on the remainder of their trip to either Fort Dodge or Fort Larned. After shepherding the travelers safely to their destination, the troops escorted wagons along the westward route back to the outpost, where they could continue on their trek to Fort Union or Santa Fe. (4)
The deterrent to hostile activity provided by the garrison at Camp Nichols, when combined with the firm and effective activities of the military in the Department of New Mexico, led to a lessening of Indian attacks on the Santa Fe Trail. Camp Nichols was originally intended to be merely a temporary effort to provide protection during the season of heaviest travel. This purpose accomplished, the post was abandoned in November, 1865. (5)
The refusal of many Indians to accept life on reservations became evident in 1868 when Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors raided in Kansas and Kiowa
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(4) Mrs. Hal Russell, "Memories of Marian
Russell," Colorado Magazine, Vol. XX, pp. 236-237.
(5) Ibid., Vol. XXI, pp. 29-33; Oliva, Soldiers on the Santa Fe Trail, p.
164.
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and Comanche war parties struck in Texas. To stifle the irritating raids, Lieutenant General William T. Sherman, commanding the Military Department of the Missouri, mounted an intensive winter campaign against the renegades. Responsibility for the atrocities in Kansas and Texas lay with certain bands, not entire tribes; therefore, Sherman directed friendly Indians to restrict themselves to authorized areas to avoid the onslaught of troops commanded by General Phillip H. Sheridan. To consolidate friendly Indians in the area, Sherman appointed Brigadier General William B. Hazen to head the southern Indian district, with headquarters at Fort Cobb, Indian Territory. The post had been abandoned in 1861, but Hazen was to use the old post as a nucleus for his agency. (6)
The post was reopened in October, 1868, by an advance contingent from Fort Arbuckle, Indians began assembling there in accordance with Sherman’s orders, and the troops began the task of restoring the remaining stone facilities for use. To Hazen and his men fell the responsibility of providing supplies and rations promised to the Indians in exchange for peace. Hundreds of Indians of various tribes encamped in the area around the fort. The distribution of rations and supplies was the primary function of the garrison at Fort Cobb. On ration day thousands of Indians converged on the post to receive supplies. Complaints about the quality and quantity of supplies added to the difficulty of administering such an extensive program. However, Fort Cobb served a crucial function because the promise of provisions and guidance was the strongest influence in preventing the Indians from taking to the warpath. (7)
By November, 1868, a diverse multitude had settled along the Washita River near Fort Cobb to signify their peaceful dispositions and receive sustenance from the government. Hazen was concerned lest some bands, who had tarried on the way from Kansas, encountered the wrath of Sheridan’s vengeance in his campaign against hostiles. Sheridan was determined to bring the miscreants, particularly Cheyenne and Arapaho, to justice as soon as possible and by whatever means necessary. On November 20, Chiefs Black Kettle and Big Mouth of the Cheyenne asked permission from Hazen to camp near the fort. This plea Hazen refused, stating that these bands were at war with General Sheridan and would have to seek terms with him. Thus rebuffed, these bands returned to camp on the Washita River far to
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(6) Marvin E. Krocker, Great Plains Command: William B.
Hazen in the Frontier West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p.
74: Muriel Wright, "A History of Fort Cobb," The Chronicles of
Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIV, No. I (Spring, 1956), pp. 58-62; United States
Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War, 1869 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1869), pp. 45-51, 69.
(7) Kroeker, Great Plains Command, pp. 76-78, 80-82.
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the northwest where one week later they were decimated by Lieutenant Colonel George A Custer’s 7th Cavalry at the Battle of the Washita. (8)
The intimidation provided by the defeat of Black Kettle’s Cheyennes led other tribes in the area to hasten to Fort Cobb to assure the authorities of their peaceful intentions. Sheridan’s troopers continued on their march toward Fort Cobb. On December 18, they arrived at the post and set up camp. Sheridan placed Kiowa chiefs Santana and Long Wolf under arrest upon his arrival to insure that the remainder of the Kiowas would report to Fort Cobb as directed. Sheridan’s determination to halt marauding on the Southern Plains convinced most of the tribes in the area to accept the reservation. (9)
The battle-weary troops camped at Fort Cobb found a scene of considerable activity. The administration of the various Indian tribes occupied the time of the men under Hazen’s command. The bustle of camp life allowed soldiers and Indians to mingle and observe one another. The soldiers erected tents and dug square pits to live in during their brief stay at the fort. They were called upon to supervise the distribution of rations and to keep the hordes of Indians controlled. While the soldiers were thus engaged, the weather at the post became almost unbearable. Incessant rain soaked the troops and their supplies and filled their shallow living quarters, turning the entire camp into a morass of mud. Sheridan decided shortly after his arrival to abandon the post in favor of a site farther south, closer to the Kiowa and Comanche reservation and to the Texas border. He sent Colonel Benjamin Grierson to choose a suitable location. Grierson settled on the site of Camp Wichita near Medicine Bluff. The garrison at Fort Cobb was ordered to move to the new post, later to become Fort Sill. (10)
With the establishment of Fort Sill, the army had a strong base from which to pursue the Indians who continued to plague the area. The post was located near the Kiowa-Comanche Agency to provide a deterrent to runaways, and it was near enough to the Texas border to provide assistance with punitive sorties against raiders in northern Texas. However, a single post to cover such an extensive area of the Indian Territory was not sufficient. Supply lines would be broken or over-extended if all Army patrols had to rely on Fort Sill for support. Troops could not depart from Fort Sill and reach troubled areas in time to deal with the guilty parties, who would vanish into Texas or return to the reservation and the protection of Indian agents.
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(8) Ibid., pp. 78-80.
(9) De Bienville Randolph Keim, Sheridan’s Troopers on the Borders (Philadelphia:
1885), p. 165; Kroeker, Great Plains Command, p. 86; Leckie, Military
Conquest, pp. 108-113.
(10) Ibid., pp. 111-112; Keim, Sheridan’s Troopers, pp. 172-173;
Krocker, Great Plains Command, pp. 85-86.
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To provide more efficient control of the area, authorities at Fort Sill established outposts. These satellites were supplied with men and provisions from the main post, and extended the influence of the Army in maintaining order around the reservations.
One of the outposts from Fort Sill was established the summer of 1871 on Otter Creek, west of the main post. This camp, almost on the site of old Camp Radziminski, usually consisted of fewer than three companies of troops. These troops escorted supply trains passing through the area to their destinations. Patrols went out from Camp Otter to check reports of Indian depredations and to deal with the perpetrators. The other major outposts, Camp Augur, was located south of Fort Sill on the Red River. This post was also sparsely populated; however, a constant flow of troops traveled between it and the main post. Camp Augur’s major purpose was to provide a base from which the soldiers of the 10th Cavalry could patrol the reservation line. Kiowa and Comanche warriors who considered leaving the reservation for the warpath had to consider the consequences of being brought to justice quickly by the roving cavalrymen. (11)
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(11) United States Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War, 1870 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870), pp. 6-14; Adjutant General’s Office, Post Returns, Fort Sill, Indian Territory, September 3, 1871, October 4, 1871, November 18, 1871, July, 1872; Special Orders, Fort Sill, Indian Territory, June-September, 1871 (Fort Sill Museum Library, Fort Sill, Oklahoma).
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In July, 1889, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, commanding the Dept. of the Missouri, issued directives for field maneuvers to take place in the fall of that year. The site selected for these maneuvers was in present day Kay county of the undulating prairies north of Chilocco Creek. The site was named Camp Schofield in honor of General John Schofield, the current General-in-Chief of the Army. Troops from post through out the department were ordered to rendezvous at camp Schofield on September 23. The operation included large contingents of cavalry, infantry and artillery to initiate a comprehensive training exercise. Troops from the major and minor posts in Oklahoma, including the Indian scouts, joined those from surrounding states. From Forts Crawford, Lyon and Logan in Colorado came infantry. From Forts Hays, Leavenworth and Riley in Kansas came cavalry, infantry and artillery. Infantry from Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and Little Rock Barracks, Arkansas, and cavalry from Fort Elliott, Texas joined the pilgrimage to northern Oklahoma.
The training exercise provided instruction and practice in almost all aspects of combat preparedness. The logistical problems inherent in assembling a large body of troops provided valuable practical experience in transportation. When all the troops arrived at Camp Schofield, it numbered 86 officers and 1,583 enlisted men. The operations around Chilocco Creek were meant to simulate combat conditions as nearly as possible. Cavalry units wheeled and galloped over the rolling grasslands in mock charges. Infantry units moved en masse, charging breastworks and firing volleys at imaginary foes. Artillery units devastated trees and landscape with precise assaults on phantom enemies. As the units honed their skills separately, they also worked in conjunction with the other branches, the swiftness of the cavalry complementing the massed force of the infantry, while howitzers sent their lethal charges screaming overhead in support. Specified units wore brown fatigue coats or white stable frocks to designate them as enemy forces to lend authenticity to the proceedings and enthusiasm to the performance of the troops. The soldiers participated actively in accordance with ground rule established by Merritt and his staff. (24)
After more than a week of drill and mock combat, the troops passed in review before their commanders. The sight of twenty-one troops of cavalry and thirteen companies of infantry massed into a precisely functioning whole signified the success of the operation. Another week of perfecting various martial skills followed. The apparent success of the affair and the threat of inclement weather led General Merritt to bring the exercises to an end. On October 11, 1889, the troops left Camp Schofield to return to their respective bases. Merritt considered the operation valuable for officers and men. The dust and smoke created by mock battles was disseminated by the swirling breezes, leaving new prairies of northern Oklahoma once more silent and uninhabited. (25)
The operations at Camp Schofield signaled a new phase of military responsibility in Oklahoma. The Army changed from an active enforcer of government polity to another branch of the federal bureaucracy. The Army had served its function well in the Indian Territory in the pivotal years between 1865 and 1890. The supplementary posts established for specific purposes accomplished their goals and were crucial to the effectiveness of the Army in the area. As the need dwindled, these posts faded into the past. However, they hold firm positions in the panorama of Oklahoma history; because they performed their tasks well, the region was transformed from wasteland to territorial status and eventually to statehood.
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(24) Ibid., pp. 239-247.
(25) Ibid., pp. 248-257. The entire report of the maneuvers at Camp
Schofield was reprinted as a supplement to the Army and Navy Journal for
January and February pg 1890.
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Submitted by Sandi Carter & Marlene Clark
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